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JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS: 
THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE 
EAGLE 
 
 
“...[T]he alliance between the United States [and] Japan is the 
foundation for security and prosperity not just for our two countries 
but for the Asia-Pacific region.” 
President Barack Obama, 13 November 2009. 
“...the Japan-US alliance, in addition to being the cornerstone of 
Japanese diplomacy and national security, is public goods essential 
for the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the 
world.” 
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, 24 January 2012. 
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PROLOGUE 
“The proper office of a friend is to side with you when you are in the 
wrong. Nearly anybody will side with you when you are in the right.” 
 
Mark Twain [1835-1910] Author and Humourist 
“The Japanese chose the principle of eternal peace as the basis of 
morality for our rebirth after the War.” 
 
Kenzaburo Oe [Born 1935] 
Nobel Laureate for Literature 1994 
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I. 52 YEARS OF ALLIANCE – AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP 
Japan and the United States have been military allies and trading 
partners now for more than five decades. Like all relations between 
sovereign states there have been issues of strong mutual agreement 
and also of sharp contention. Japan’s entire post-war security has 
been underwritten by American firepower, deterring any potential 
enemy from attacking any part of Japanese territory. Japan, for the 
most part, has been willing to accept such protection on the 
conditions that it provide for its own defence and that it permit the 
stationing of American forces on Japanese soil.
 
The Democratic Party of Japan(DPJ) first Prime Minister, Mr Yukio 
Hatoyama, drove US-Japan relations to a low point when he 
suggested that the Futenma Base should be moved from Okinawa 
entirely – not rebuilt on a reclaimed site in the North. Mr Hatoyama 
also proposed the creation of an East Asia community, akin to the 
European Union, an idea that many in Washington viewed as a sign 
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of a closer Japanese alignment with China, to the possible detriment 
to relations with the United States. 1 In essence, it seems that, whilst 
Japan wants friendly relations with China, it also wants the 
reassurance of a US alliance as China’s power grows. 2 
As the following Table shows, there have been a number of cordial as 
well as contentious issues in this most important of bilateral 
relationships. 
BALANCED CONSIDERATIONS: 
STRENGTHS & TENSIONS IN THE JAPAN-US RELATIONSHIP 
 
CORDIAL ISSUES CONTENTIOUS ISSUES 
DIRECT JAPANESE INVESTMENT 
IN THE US 
OPEN JAPANESE MARKET FOR US 
PRODUCTS 
DEPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE 
TROOPS IN IRAQ 
RETENTION OF US MARINES BASE 
ON OKINAWA 
RESISTANCE TO “ROGUE STATE” 
OF  
NORTH KOREA 
TRADE DISPUTES (TEXTILES, 
PHARMACEUTICALS, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS) 
JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-
MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS 
BAN ON US BEEF EXPORTS TO 
JAPAN 
OPPOSITION TO  
TERRORISM 
US REFUSAL TO RATIFY KYOTO 
PROTOCOL 
 
On balance, the relationship between the two countries is generally 
in a sound condition. Japanese people hold friendly views of 
Americans 
                                                          
1
 Chico Harlan, “Japan trying to repair ties with Washington”, WASHINGTON POST, 16 September 2011. 
2
 Fred Hiatt, “Where does Japan stand on relations with the US?”, WASHINGTON POST, 2 April 2010. 
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and Japan is one of the world’s largest holders of United States 
Treasury Securities.  
Successive US Governments, though, have voiced concerns over 
what they have seen as worrisome and unacceptable trade deficits. 
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In 2010, America had a trade deficit in excess of US$50 billion. 
 
Moreover, three years previously in 2007, statistics showed that 
almost half of America’s trade debt occurred in commerce with East 
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Asia.
 
Two current points of contention, though, concern US 
encouragement of a reluctant Japan to “sign on” to the Trans Pacitic 
Partnership agreement (which is opposed domestically in Japan by 
agricultural and medical interest groups) 
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and the retention of US bases on 
Okinawa (a matter highly unpopular with local residents who want 
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such forces to leave.)  
Sometimes, such tensions are not soothed because of critical 
opinions expressed by American officials. Mr Kevin Maher, formerly 
the Director of the Office of Japan Affairs and a former US Consul-
General to Okinawa, gave a querulous lecture at an American 
University during which he described Okinawan people as “master[s] 
of manipulation and extortion” in relation to the Futenma 
controversy. Mr Maher was subsequently dismissed from his position 
by the US State Department.3 
Such ill-considered remonstrations, though, have not totally 
disrupted the bilateral relationship. Indeed, matters have been 
smoothed over considerably by the decision of the Noda 
Government to buy the latest American jet fighter for the Air Self 
Defence Force. By purchasing the Lockheed-Martin Joint Strike 
Fighter F-35 Lightning II as its next generation fighter aircraft, Japan 
gains a double benefit of the most advanced military technology 
                                                          
3
 Kosuke Takahashi, “Scandals strain US-Japan relations”, ASIA TIMES, 12 March 2011. 
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available as well as good relations with the United States.
 The F-35 gives Japan a viable successor for its fleet of F-15 fighters. 
The F-35 also matches the capabilities of Chinese and Russian stealth 
fighters.4 
II. WHAT TO DO ABOUT CHINA AND TAIWAN 
President Hu’s State Visit to Washington in January 2011 took place 
against a backdrop of rising tension and mutual distrust among 
                                                          
4
 Humza Ahmad, “F-35 fighter deal brings Japan multiple benefits”, JAPAN TIMES, 22 December 2011. 
11 | P a g e  
 
China, Japan and the United States.  
China’s political, economic and military power is on the rise, 
challenging US dominance in the Pacific.5  
 
When Japan arrested a Chinese fishing boat captain whose boat 
rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China retaliated by banning exports of rare 
earth material to Japan, forcing Japan’s Government into a 
humiliating back down.6 
The United States is unlikely to remain the sole guarantor of East 
Asia’s security. The US-Japan alliance remains important, but in 
future, regional security will depend on greater collaboration 
between the United States and its allies as well as increased 
American engagement with China. 7 
                                                          
5
 John J. Brandon and Scott Snyder, “A rising need for US-Japan-China trilateral dialogue”, IN ASIA – THE ASIA 
FOUNDATION, 16 February 2011. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
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Each power in the 
Japan-China-United 
States triangle has 
an overriding 
interest in 
preserving its national security. Each Government identifies 
economic might as a principal constituent of national power. Each 
defines peace, stability and mutual benefit as goals of its foreign 
relations.8 
For its part, the US wishes to see a domestically stable China; 
“functional” to “good” Sino-Japanese relations; and a more confident 
and independent Japan.9 
 
For its part, Japan has yet to devise self-assertive policies out from 
under the “US yoke.” Japan’s interests lies in 
access to markets and energy; working within regional security 
                                                          
8
 Paul Frandano, “The Japan-China-United States triangle: interest, uncertainty and choice”, NORTH EAST ASIA 
WORKING GROUP, PAPER NO.1, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, November 2006. 
9
 Ibid. 
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arrangements; and resolving the abduction-of-Japanese-citizens as a 
top priority with North Korea.10 
For its part, China  seeks to reduce its 
vulnerability to United States actions; avoiding provocative 
behaviour; building bilateral ties with all of its neighbours (including 
Japan); and replacing perceptions of a “China threat” by improving 
image and applying “soft power.”11 
The Chinese find the strengthening US-Japan security alliance and 
the guidelines for military cooperation between the two countries to 
be threatening and dangerous
 for four main reasons. First, it goes against the peaceful trend in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Second, the scope has widened from protecting 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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only Japan to the entire Asia-Pacific region. Third, the guidelines give 
Japan a security role in “surrounding areas” (this possibly being as 
large as the Asia-Pacific itself) rather than a strict application to self-
defence. Fourth, the area covered by bilateral security arrangements 
include Taiwan, a matter deemed unacceptable to the Chinese.12 
The Taiwan issue  still 
poses a formidable challenge to stable American and Japanese 
relations with China. Japan’s new security commitment under the 
revised security guidelines has placed Tokyo in a very difficult 
position, between preserving its alliance with the United States and 
yet maintaining stable relations with China. Tokyo’s best hope is a 
peaceful resolution of cross-strait conflict. If not, in the event of 
armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait,
 Tokyo might have to provide 
                                                          
12
 Chu Shulong, “China and the US-Japan and US-Korea alliances in a changing Northeast Asia”, ASIA PACIFIC 
RESEARCH CENTER, June 1999. 
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logistical support for American military intervention, at the risk of 
triggering a confrontation with China.13
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Qingxin Ken Wang, “Taiwan in Japan’s relations with China and the United States after the Cold War”, 
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 73 (3) 2000. 
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However, all is not threat, counter-threat or the likelihood of 
extensive devastation. Opinion in the United States, according to a 
recent CNN Poll,  found that 
Americans are almost evenly divided as to whether their country 
should go to war over a Chinese attack upon Taiwan. Additionally, 
both China and Taiwan have a booming level of economic 
intermeshing, amounting to tens of billions of dollars a year.
 China is aware 
that it is being overwhelmingly “outspent” on the acquisition, 
maintenance and development of advanced weapons systems by the 
United States. Such a degree of spending 
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will continue to 
maintain superior (and ruinous) American firepower and capacity to 
wage all-out warfare. Finally, both Japan and the United States are 
substantially integrating both the defensive and attacking capabilities 
of their respective armed forces,
 holding joint 
exercises to test their combined weapons systems and degree of 
effectively coordinated ability to deliver fire in combat. 
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III. WHAT TO DO ABOUT NORTH KOREA 
North Korea is a single party state led by the Korean Workers’ Party. 
It follows the juche ideology  of self-reliance 
developed by Kim Il-sung. Juche became the official state ideology 
under the constitution of 1972. After the collapse of the USSR and a 
series of natural disasters, as many as two million people died of 
famine. Leader Kim Jong-Il then adopted Songun, or a “military first” 
policy  in order to strengthen the regime’s 
control over the country. North Korea is a totalitarian Stalinist 
dictatorship with an elaborate cult of personality around the Kim 
family. Its human rights record is one of the world’s worst. It has an 
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estimated population of 25 million people and a GDP of barely US$40 
billion a year. 
Aid agencies have estimated that up to a further two million people 
have died since the mid-1990s because of food shortages
 caused by natural disasters and 
economic mismanagement. The country depends heavily on foreign 
aid to feed its people. 
There are 
an estimated 200,000 political prisoners (almost one per cent of the 
entire population) held in prison camps 
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– where inmates 
are subjected to torture, public executions and even infanticide.
 No political dissent of any kind 
is tolerated. Following the death of Kim Jong-Il in December 2011, 
some analysts predict little change in the nature of the political 
system. Regime members are probably likely to preserve the rigid 
status quo and, thereby, protect and maintain their privileged 
positions where no luxury is denied them.14  
Following the death by heart attack (although some analysts 
speculate hidden murder by the military in a concealed coup) of Kim 
Jong-Il, two weeks of mourning ensued, culminating in a mass rally 
on 29 December 2011 at which tens of thousands of North Koreans
                                                          
14
 “North Korea Profile”, BBC NEWS – ASIA PACIFIC, 1 January 2012. 
 
21 | P a g e  
 
 rallied to pledge their allegiance to his designated successor, his 
third son, Kim Jong-un. Whether he will rule unchallenged or be 
forced to rely on caretakers or regents is unclear. Publicly, he will not 
share power with anyone. On 11 January 2012, in an understated 
attempt at reconciliation, the regime issued a press statement saying 
it was open to further negotiations over a bargain to halt its uranium 
enrichment programme. A spokesman said “We will wait and see if 
the United States has a willingness to establish confidence.” 15 Past 
experience of such notionally agreeable statements indicates that 
this could simply be yet another ruse to wring unwilling concessions 
from the West. 
                                                          
15
 “North Korea”, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 January 2012. 
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Kim Jong-un  
is believed to be aged in his late 20s – his youth and inexperience 
making him vulnerable to power struggles and high echelon 
intrigues. The support of the military is utterly crucial if he is to retain 
and to consolidate power in the near-bankrupt and starving country 
his father 
‘bequeathed’ to him. Jang Song-taek, 
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Kim’s uncle 
and a vice chairman of the powerful National Defence Commission, 
pointedly appeared in public on 24 December 2011 in an allegiance-
swearing ceremony, wearing the coveted uniform of a full general. 
On 28 December 2011, the day of Kim Jong-Il’s funeral, neither of 
Kim Jong-un’s brothers – Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chol – was 
seen anywhere. No official messages of condolence were sent to 
Pyongyang either from Seoul or Washington. 16 
Of interest is the recently published prediction, ascribed to the eldest 
son of the late leader, that the North Korean regime will soon fail, 
with or without reforms – according to a new book based on emails 
from the ‘jilted’ son as written by Tokyo journalist, Yoji Gomi. The 
                                                          
16
 Ibid. Clearly the death of the tyrannical dictator was not an occasion of grief in either major capital. Neither 
government of such democratic countries was prepared to be hypocritical and express false sorrow for a ruler 
who held to power by imprisonment, torture and summary murder - showering himself and his supporters 
with many luxuries whilst an estimated six million (almost one quarter) of his citizens suffered malnutrition. 
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book says that Kim Jong-nam 
– who 
has never met the new leader, his half-brother Kim Jong-un – 
reportedly described the dynastic succession as “a joke to the outside 
world”. “The Kim Jong-un regime will not last long”, he was cited as 
saying, forecasting a power struggle.
 “Without reforms, 
North Korea will collapse, and when such changes [do] take place, 
the regime will collapse [in any case.]” 17 
                                                          
17
 Jonathan Watts and Tania Branigan, “North Korea’s leader will not last long, says Kim Jong-un’s brother”, 
THE GUARDIAN, 17 January 2012. 
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The most serious and pressing issue affecting “normalization” of 
relations between Japan and North Korea concerns the (admitted) 
abduction of up to 35 Japanese citizens by the North Korean secret 
service to assist in the training of espionage agents to be sent to spy 
on Japan.
 No 
country can tolerate such an outrageous and criminal assault on its 
sovereignty and safety of its citizens. 
In view of strong public opinion on the abduction issue, no Japanese 
government can afford to make progress toward normal relations 
without a resolution on Japan’s terms.18 The abductions have earned 
North Korea the label of “terrorist” and “evil” state in Japanese 
                                                          
18
 Alex Berkofsky, “Japan-North Korea: (Sad) State of Play and (Sad) Prospects”, INSTITUT FRANCAIS DES 
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (Ifri), Paris/Brussels, June 2009. 
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domestic political discourse.
 
The resumption of Japanese food and humanitarian aid will continue 
to depend on Pyongyang’s willingness to give Tokyo much more 
information on the fate of the abductees. 
The North Korean regime, though, will 
probably continue to ignore such Japanese requests – thereby 
stalemating the entire diplomatic process. 19 
 
                                                          
19
 Axel Berkofsky, “Japan-North Korea Relations: Bad and Not Getting Better”, INSTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI 
POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE (ISPI), Policy Brief No. 193, July 2010. 
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Regarding North Korean threats to its national security, Japan’s 
concerns centre on: 
 Incursions on the main Islands by North Korean guerrilla 
fighters 
 Incursions by North Korean naval forces into Japan’s territorial 
waters 
 Attacks on nuclear reactors along the coast of the Sea of Japan 
 Air strikes on major cities by North Korean “Nodong” Class 
missiles. 20 
 
Today, hundreds of North Korean missiles 
are believed to 
be aimed at Japan and South Korea. Of most concern to Japan’s 
defence planners is the highly limited amount of time available for 
counter-measures should North Korea fire numerous missiles at 
targets all over Japan. It is known, for example, that Pyongyang’s 
“Nodong” missiles are capable of striking central Tokyo in less than 
                                                          
20
 Berkofsky (2010) ISPI Policy Brief. 
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10 minutes after launch.  Since North 
Korea launched a rogue missile directly over Northern Japan in 
August 1998 – a terrifying and ominous occurrence – Japan and the 
United States have been working on the development of a regional 
missile defence system. 21 
The CIA estimated publicly in November 2002 that North Korea could 
produce two atomic bombs a year through its Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) facilities, commencing in 2005. North Korea needs six 
to eight kilogrammes of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. 
Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are 
                                                          
21
 Berkofsky (2009) Ifri. 
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located at Yongbyon,  96 
kilometres from Pyongyang. 22 
Applying CIA estimates, North Korea could, in 2012, now have a 
stockpile of up to 14 atomic bombs. As for delivery systems, 
Pyongyang possesses those as well, with “Nodong” missiles having a 
strike range of between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometres – such missiles, 
numbering some 200, could also be armed with either conventional 
high explosive warheads, or, just as deadly, chemical or biological 
weapons. 23 
                                                          
22
 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy”, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, Washington DC, 10 September 2007. 
23
 Berkofsky (2010) Op.Cit. 
30 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stated American policy towards North Korea supports the peaceful 
reunification of Korea on terms acceptable to the Korean people and 
recognizes that the future of the Korean Peninsula is primarily a 
matter for them to decide. 24  
Given that ultimate objective, however, the Six Party Talks have been 
discontinued now for almost six years and the position of the US 
Government is firm and uncompromising. “The United States is not 
                                                          
24
 “Background Note: North Korea”, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 31 
October 2011. 
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going to accept a nuclear North Korea”, as Scott Snyder, Adjunct 
Senior Fellow for Korean Studies at the Council for Foreign Relations, 
explains. “As a result, it really limited the bandwidth for conducting a 
negotiation.” 25 
Over the past 20 years, North Korea has swung between 
confrontation and inch-by-inch conciliation with its neighbours and 
the United States, in an oscillation that seems to be driven both by 
its hard-to-fathom internal political strains and by an apparent belief 
in brinkmanship as the most effective form of diplomacy.26 
Under Kim Jong Il, North Korea became a nuclear power. It also 
became the world’s most isolated state, one in which unknown 
numbers starved during recurrent famines while money flowed into 
the country’s military programmes. In 2010, the North took a series 
of provocative actions, including the apparent sinking of a South 
Korean naval vessel and the artillery shelling of a South Korean island 
outpost. Observers linked the incidents to Kim Senior’s desire to 
establish his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as a credible leader in the 
eyes of the North Korean military. 
                                                          
25
 Scott Snyder, “US-North Korea: Stalemate”, Interview with Bernard Gwertzman, CFR Editor, COUNCIL FOR 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 16 March 2010. 
26
 “North Korea”, NEW YORK TIMES, 12 January 2012. 
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Although 
malnutrition has improved in the DPRK in the past decade, one in 
three North Korean children is stunted and nearly one in five is 
underweight, according to the World Food Programme. 27 
The United States came close to military action against North Korea 
in 1994, as President Clinton weighed the idea of American air strikes 
against DPRK nuclear sites. Instead, in an eleventh hour 
arrangement, North Korea agreed to shelve its nuclear programme – 
an agreement it has long since repudiated, continuing its nuclear 
activities. 28 
With the death of Kim Jong Il and the notional accession to power of 
his little-known third son, Kim Jong-un, there is much speculation 
about who the real powerbrokers will be in the new regime about to 
emerge. A number of the following nine known candidates for power 
and influence are as follows: 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
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The nine candidates, whose numbered images appear above, are: 
1) Choe Ryong-hae (responsible for mass mobilization 
campaigns) 
2) Kim Yang-kon (unification minister responsible for South 
Korean policy) 
3) Ri Yong ho (key military and national security advisor) 
4) Jang Song-taek ( regarded by analysts as the “No. 2” man in 
the power elite, after the late Kim Jong Il) 
5) U Tong-chuk (responsible for oversight of the daily 
operations of a key state security agency) 
6) Kim Won-hong ( responsible for the prevention of military 
coups and ensuring widespread, conformist loyalty to the 
new Government) 
7) Yun Jong-rin (responsible for the personal security of the 
regime’s core elite) 
8) Kim Kyong-hui (the late Kin Jong Il’s sister and wife to 
powerbroker Jang Song-taek, who herself, has been at the 
locus of power for almost 40 years) 
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9) Kang Sok-ju (principal foreign affairs negotiator.) 29 
The United States sympathizes with Japan over the abductions issue, 
though politely urges Japan to allow other matters to be dealt with in 
terms of re-starting the stalled Six Party Talks and the resumption of 
financial and humanitarian aid packages. 
Speaking before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
March 2011, a senior State Department official, Kurt M. Campbell, 
said: 
“We think that Japan should follow the ROK 
and take steps to accede to the Hague 
Convention on International Parental Child 
Abduction...North Korea remains Japan’s 
most immediate national security concern 
and a key feature of our diplomatic 
engagement with Tokyo. North Korea’s 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs and 
past abduction of Japanese citizens 
underscore the tangible threat the DPRK 
poses to Japan’s national security...The 
United States fully supports Japanese efforts 
to resolve the issue of Japanese citizens 
abducted by North Korea.” 30 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 “Old leaders who may wield power in North Korea’s new Government”, NEW YORK TIMES, 21 December 
2011. 
30
 Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S. Policy toward North 
Korea – Remarks”, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Washington DC, 1 March 2011. 
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IV. CONCLUSION – ALLIANCE  & FRICTION 
Since the resignation of the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) first 
Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, in June 2010, bilateral relations 
have been relatively smoother 
under the leadership of Naoto Kan 
and recently-elected Yoshihiko 
Noda. The DPJ has appeared to 
have shifted its strategic thinking 
after a series of provocations from 
North Korea and growing 
assertiveness from the Chinese in 
disputed waters. The massive and immediate relief provided by the 
United States following the 11 March disaster bolstered the 
relationship further. 31 
 
Japan, it needs to be remembered, is one of the United States’ most 
important economic partners. Outside of North America, it is the 
United States’ second largest export market and second largest 
source of imports. Japanese firms are the United States’ second 
largest source of foreign investment, and Japanese investors are the 
second largest foreign holders of United States Treasuries, helping to 
finance the United States deficit and reduce upward pressure on 
United States interest rates. 32 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper and Mark E. Manyin, “Japan – U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress”, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 23 September 2011. 
32
 Ibid. 
36 | P a g e  
 
The following Table, depicting US trade with Japan for the three 
selected years 2000, 2005 and 2010, warrants attention. 
 
UNITED STATES TRADE WITH JAPAN, SELECTED YEARS 
(US$ billions) 
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCES 
2000 65.3 146.6 MINUS 81.3 
2005 55.4 138.1 MINUS 82.7 
2010 60.5 120.3 MINUS 59.8 
[SOURCE: US Commerce Department] 
An analysis of these figures shows that, in 2000, the United States 
bought 2.24 times more goods and services than it sold. In 2005, the 
figure was 2.49 times more; whilst in 2010, the figure was 1.99 times 
more. Thus, from this sobering perspective, over the three particular 
years depicted above, United States imports from Japan exceeded 
United States exports to Japan by an average of 224%.33 
For the present, the United States-Japan alliance does not face any 
immediate crisis. In the light of an emergent, more assertive China, 
both countries recognize their mutual dependence in order to keep 
China in check. Such logic was evident 
in the aftermath of the Senkaku “fishing trawler” incident, after 
                                                          
33
 Analysis compiled by Author, Dr Michael Vaughan, 29 January 2012. 
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which China threatened to escalate tensions, prompting the United 
States to arrive by way of adding more diplomatic “muscle” to Japan. 
34 
Yet, the “back-to-
normal” 
sentiments 
conceal deeper 
problems that 
undermine 
relations. More 
than ever, 
Japanese are 
becoming disenchanted with America. In Okinawa, for example, 
applications for base jobs have declined by nearly 50% from 15,572 
applicants in 2003 to 7,611 in 2009. Japanese students seem less 
interested in studying English in America, with enrolment in US 
universities falling by 27% between 2000 and 2010. 35 
In Alistair Su’s opinion: 
“Where the alliance once existed as an 
active and dynamic bilateral relationship, 
judging from current circumstances, it’s 
hard to see where the alliance derives any 
existential meaning apart from its role in 
moderating China.” 36 
                                                          
34
 Alistair Su, “U.S. – Japan Relations: A Friendship Grown Cold”, HARVARD POLITICAL REVIEW, 31 October 
2010. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
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Still, the US- 
Japan 
alliance is 
still in full 
working 
order. 
Regular 
joint 
military 
exercises take place and expenditure on military technology remains 
high.  
  
In closing, it can be said that, American beliefs as to the danger or 
friendliness of various countries in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere 
reflect Japan’s perceived threats. It seems that a number of the 
United States’ adversaries are seen as Japan’s adversaries also.
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 Particular wariness, 
in both Washington and Tokyo, attaches to North Korea – a not 
altogether surprising occurrence.
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EPILOGUE 
“A war in the Taiwan Strait would destroy China’s international 
relations overnight. It would destroy Chinese- Japanese relations, not 
to mention Chinese-American relations.” 
William Kirby 
Chang Professor of China Studies 
Harvard University. 
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
 Combat Radius – over 1,110 km 
 Cost – Between US$28 million and US$38 million each 
 Payload – Between 5,900 kg and 7,720 kg 
 Speed – Supersonic 
 Weapons Systems – multifunction radar, electronic 
countermeasure equipment, electro-optical targeting system, 
infrared sensor thermal imaging system, helmet-mounted 
display 
 
 
 
